Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement
Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS).
CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented
Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data
and return addresses are accompanied by so called "shadow stacks",
holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren't
writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their
contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address
coming from the traditional stack.
In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In
various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of
the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then
invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an
exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly.
Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn't right:
Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack.
The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Mon, 12 May 2025 15:30:00 +0000
Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
---|---|---|
First Time appeared |
Fedoraproject
Fedoraproject fedora Xen Xen xen |
|
Weaknesses | NVD-CWE-Other | |
CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:40:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:xen:xen:*:*:*:*:*:*:x86:* |
|
Vendors & Products |
Fedoraproject
Fedoraproject fedora Xen Xen xen |
Sat, 26 Apr 2025 20:45:00 +0000
Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
---|---|---|
References |
|
Thu, 13 Feb 2025 17:30:00 +0000
Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
---|---|---|
Description | Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS). CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data and return addresses are accompanied by so called "shadow stacks", holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren't writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address coming from the traditional stack. In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly. Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn't right: Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack. The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing. | Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS). CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data and return addresses are accompanied by so called "shadow stacks", holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren't writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address coming from the traditional stack. In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly. Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn't right: Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack. The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing. |
Tue, 05 Nov 2024 19:15:00 +0000
Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
---|---|---|
Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|

Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: XEN
Published:
Updated: 2025-04-26T20:03:14.322Z
Reserved: 2023-10-27T07:55:35.333Z
Link: CVE-2023-46841

Updated: 2025-04-26T20:03:14.322Z

Status : Analyzed
Published: 2024-03-20T11:15:08.220
Modified: 2025-05-12T15:06:58.113
Link: CVE-2023-46841

No data.